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In a series of provocative articles, Professor Lawrence Lessig has devel-
oped a theory of constitutional translation and applied that theory to the
Commerce Clause.' His writings have illuminated two important issues
under the Commerce Clause: the clause's adaptability to technological
change and economic integration, and the impact of that adaptability on state
sovereignty. Lessig's translation theory, however, would also shed light on a
third, more central issue of Commerce Clause interpretation: does that
clause support expansive federal regulation of social problems only tangen-
tially related to the economy?
This Essay briefly reviews the two questions Lessig has analyzed under
the Commerce Clause. The Essay then turns to the third, too often over-
looked problem of Commerce Clause interpretation and explores how Les-
sig's theory might address that question. The Essay suggests that courts
could translate the list of congressional powers in Article I, Section 8 of the
Constitution to allow Congress to regulate any subject that the states cannot
govern effectively on their own. This translation builds upon the history of
Article I and adds coherence to current Supreme Court doctrine.
.
The first question of interpretation that arises under the Commerce
Clause is whether the clause allows Congress to regulate business practices
that now affect "Commerce... among the several States,"'2 even though the
same activities would not have affected interstate commerce in the eight-
eenth century. In one recent paper, Lessig illustrates this interpretive ques-
tion with the example of meat packing.3 In 1787, butchering meat was a
purely local activity. Slaughter methods in Boston could not affect the price
* John Deaver Drinko/Baker & Hostetler Chair in Law, The Ohio State University.
B.A., 1977, Harvard University; J.D., 1980, Columbia University. James Brudney, Andrew Mer-
ritt, and several participants at The George Washington Law Review's Symposium on Textualism
and the Constitution made helpful comments on an earlier draft of this essay. Rachael Russo
provided invaluable research assistance.
1 See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 FoRDH M L. REV. 1365 (1997)
[hereinafter Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint]; Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEx. L.
REv. 1165 (1993) [hereinafter Lessig, Fidelity in Translation]; Lawrence Lessig, Translating Fed-
eralism: United States v Lopez, 1995 Sup. Cr. RFv. 125 [hereinafter Lessig, Translating Federal-
ism]; Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN . L. Rav.
395 (1995).
2 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
3 Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, supra note 1, at 1369; see also Lessig, Translating Feder-
alism, supra note 1, at 137-38 (using milk as a similar example).
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of meat in Charleston because there was no way to transport fresh meat over
long distances. Today, with the advent of refrigeration, the activities of a
Boston meat packer do affect the price of meat in Charleston. Should Con-
gress be able to regulate meat packing today?
Almost everyone now agrees that this is an easy question and that the
answer is "yes." The easy question, however, makes an important point
about textualism, translation, and original intent. Much of our Constitution
is written with abstract, timeless words. The phrase "Commerce among the
several States" is not the same as "Commerce among the several States that
was technologically feasible in 1787." In one way, the Framers understood
the clause in the latter sense because they could not picture refrigerated
trucks in 1787. In a more important way, however, the Framers understood
the words in the former, broader sense, foreseeing that the things known as
commerce would change but that Congress's power to regulate those things
would not. The authors of the Commerce Clause used ageless language to
convey their meaning, and there is no reason to read a temporal or techno-
logical limitation into the clause.
This answer to the first easy question brings Lessig to the second inter-
pretive question, one he has discussed in several articles. 4 As the economy
has become more integrated, federal power has grown. Does this growth,
faithful though it is to one part of the Constitution, upset another part of the
constitutional design? Because economic integration was low in the eight-
eenth century, the Framers believed that the states would retain substantial
power to govern large areas of law without any federal intervention. Should
the Supreme Court translate that commitment to state sovereignty to the
twentieth century by seeking ways to modulate Congress's expansive author-
ity and leave some breathing room for the states?
This translation question is important, and I agree with Lessig's central
points, although I would sketch many of the details differently. In particular,
I would stress the deep constitutional roots of the Supreme Court's anticom-
mandeering concept. That principle, which limits congressional power to is-
sue direct commands to the states,5 has a pedigree of its own; the principle is
not a newly crafted response to a bloated Commerce Clause.6 I would also
4 See Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, supra note 1, at 1379-80; Lessig, Fidelity in Transla-
tion, supra note 1, at 1224-28; Lessig, Translating Federalism, supra note 1.
5 See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144 (1992).
6 I have suggested that the anticommandeering concept is rooted in Article IV, Section 4
of the Constitution, which guarantees each state a republican form of government. See Deborah
Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88
COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1988); Deborah Jones Merritt, Republican Governments and Autonomous
States: A New Role for the Guarantee Clause, 65 U. COLO. L. REv. 815 (1994); Deborah Jones
Merritt, Three Faces of Federalism: Finding a Formula for the Future, 47 VANsD. L. Rav. 1563
(1994) [hereinafter Merritt, Three Faces of Federalism]. The Supreme Court has not founded its
anticommandeering concept on the Guarantee Clause, but has suggested that the concept flows
directly from the Constitution's structure, especially the Framers' decision to empower Congress
to regulate individuals rather than states. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2376-79; New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. at 161-66; FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 791-96 (1982) (O'Connor, J., con-
curring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). The Court also has noted the historical
absence of congressional attempts to commandeer state legislative or executive power, sug-
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be more optimistic about the states' strength on the eve of the twenty-first
century. Political rhetoric aside, state and local governments seem to be
thriving. As other scholars have noted, the last sixty years have witnessed
dramatic growth in all levels of government, not just Congress. 7 The states
have lost exclusive control over most regulatory fields, a fact that surely
would have surprised the Framers, but this loss does not mean that the states
have lost their importance or their ability to govern.8
More important than these quibbles, however, is the third interpretive
issue Lessig omits. Before we can judge the need to redress any imbalance
between state and federal power, we must determine why the imbalance has
grown so large. Technological change and economic integration explain why
Congress can regulate meat packing, as well as why it can set nationwide
minimum wages and rules to govern collective bargaining. These congres-
sional powers, however, still fall within the field of economic regulation.
Where does Congress get its power to regulate intrastate crimes, race dis-
crimination, air pollution, violence against women, and other social evils? It
is those regulations, not just laws governing an increasingly integrated econ-
omy, that have helped to swell the United States Code. Until we understand
the source of Congress's power to regulate these social problems, it is hard to
talk sensibly about the Commerce Clause.
Courts have recognized Congress's power to pass laws on all of these
subjects under the Commerce Clause. Yet, if we consider Article I, Section 8
of the Constitution as a coherent text, it is hard to discern Congress's powers
to regulate noneconomic matters.9 Section 8 enumerates more than two
dozen specific subjects that Congress may govern. The specificity of each
subject, together with the length of the list, suggests that each power is rea-
sonably finite. It is hard to believe that the Framers buried in the middle of
gesting a deeply rooted understanding that such commandeering is improper. See Printz, 117 S.
Ct. at 2370-76, 2379-83; see also Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce
Power and Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REv. 554, 593 (1995) (pro-
posing that the Necessary and Proper Clause embodies the anticommandeering principle).
7 See, e.g., Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism and the Unshackling of the
States, 64 U. CHi. L. Rav. 483 (1997). Professor Lessig recognizes this point to some extent. See
Lessig, Translating Federalism, supra note 1, at 169-70.
8 As I have argued elsewhere, exclusive control over particular legislative domains is not
essential to preserving federalism's vitality. Contemporary American society is highly inte-
grated; there are few opportunities for isolated state regulation. It is more common today for
Congress and the states to regulate cooperatively, in parallel, or (in some political climates) in
alternation. Under these circumstances, it is more important to preserve state governments as
vigorous, independent actors in a larger universe of regulation than to shield certain subjects
from national power. Protecting the autonomy of state governments thus has become more
important as a constitutional principle; this principle also is consistent with twentieth-century
needs for national regulation in a broad array of substantive arenas. See Merritt, Three Faces of
Federalism, supra note 6, at 1573-75; see also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47
FLA. L. Rav. 499, 538-39 (1995); Deborah J. Merritt, Federalism as Empowerment, 47 FLA. L.
REv. 541, 546-48 (1995).
9 Other portions of the Constitution delegate power to Congress, but Section 8 is the
primary source of congressional power to enact the type of social legislation discussed here.
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment might also support much of that legislation, but the
Court has avoided resting congressional power on that clause. I touch briefly on this problem
below. See infra notes 32-33.
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this inventory-in the second phrase of the third clause, no less-a cloaked
dynamo that one day would generate congressional power over virtually any
social problem. Yet that is exactly how the Supreme Court has interpreted
the Commerce Clause.
The Court, moreover, has interpreted the Commerce Clause expansively
with only sporadic mention of the problem.10 Scholars and lawyers have
tended to downplay the matter of social regulation as well." Compared to
the constitutional firestorm over Congress's authority to regulate the national
economy, a power the Framers clearly intended to confer, barely a candle has
flickered over Congress's power to regulate a variety of social issues.12 Yet it
is in the latter cases that the Court has wandered farthest from the apparent
meaning of the Commerce Clause and has engaged in the most extreme
forms of one type of textualism. The Court has taken the phrase "Com-
merce... among the several States" out of its documentary, historical, and
cultural context and has used that phrase to uphold regulation of any activity
that has some link to interstate commerce-even if the nexus is purely inci-
dental to the law's purpose.
This complaint does not mean that the Court should strike down all fed-
eral statutes regulating the environment, race and sex discrimination, or in-
trastate crimes. The Court should continue to uphold those statutes but
might rethink the narrow textualism it has used to achieve those ends. Part II
considers how a constitutional theorist committed to fidelity and armed with
Lessig's concept of translation might approach Congress's power to regulate
a broad range of social issues.
10 Individual Justices occasionally have questioned the scope of Congress's power to regu-
late social problems. See, e.g,, United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 759 n.4 (1987) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) ("The Constitution does not contain an explicit delegation to the Federal Govern-
ment of the power to define and administer the general criminal law."); Perez v. United States,
402 U.S. 146, 157 (1971) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("I think the Framers of the Constitution never
intended that the National Government might define as a crime and prosecute such wholly local
activity through the enactment of federal criminal laws."); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
504 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring in the result in part and dissenting in part) ("Congress has no
substantive power over sexual morality.").
The Court's most famous discussion of congressional power to regulate noneconomic mat-
ters occurred in its recent decision in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). Even there,
however, a majority of the Justices did not question precedents allowing Congress to regulate a
broad array of social problems. They focused instead on whether the economic nexus in Lopez
was sufficiently strong. See id. at 558-68.
11 A few thoughtful works, however, do exist on this topic. See, e.g., Regan, supra note 6;
William Van Alstyne, Federalism, Congress, the States and the Tenth Amendment: Adrift in the
Cellophane Sea, 1987 DuKE L.J. 769.
12 See, e.g., Robert L. Stern, The Commerce Clause Revisited-The Federalization of Intra-
state Crime, 15 ARiz. L. R-v. 271, 284 (1973) (noting that the Supreme Court's decision in Perez
v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971), upholding congressional regulation of intrastate loan shark-
ing, "is practically an unknown case .... It has attracted little publicity or attention in the
literature."). Stern, who helped defend Congress's New Deal legislation before the Supreme
Court, professed his own surprise at the Court's willingness to countenance congressional power
over intrastate crimes, "and at how readily [that] expansion [was] accepted." Id.
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The powers enumerated in Article I, Section 8 have a unifying theme:
they all concern subjects that the states cannot regulate effectively by them-
selves. More than this, the powers appear to form a complete list of the ways
in which the eighteenth-century Framers found individual state regulation in-
adequate. By 1787, the states already had shown that they could not effec-
tively regulate commerce with other nations or among themselves; nor could
they coin money without creating fiscal chaos.13 The Framers addressed
these specific problems in Section 8. Can we abstract from the Framers' list a
more general principle, that Congress should have the power to regulate
whenever the states cannot do the job effectively, and then translate that
principle to the twentieth century? This translation is a more audacious task
than the ones Lessig has discussed, but is this translation a plausible interpre-
tation of Section 8?14
The history of Section 8 is relevant to this inquiry. Curiously, the Fram-
ers originally expressed Congress's powers with just the abstract, unifying
principle I have described. When the Constitutional Convention met in Phil-
adelphia, the Virginia delegation proposed giving Congress power "to legis-
late in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent, or in which the
harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individ-
ual Legislation."' ' The full Convention approved this language twice, 16 and
even expanded upon the principle by adding a power to "legislate in all cases
for the general interests of the Union. '17 Members of the Convention de-
bated briefly, but did not resolve, whether these principles could be reduced
13 See, e.g., WILLIAM B. LOCKHART ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES, CoMMENTs,
QUESTIONS 76-77 (7th ed. 1991) (summarizing the difficulties created by states under the Arti-
cles of Confederation); 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 316-19 (Max
Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937) [hereinafter THE RECORDS] (June 19) (notes of James Madison)
(speech by Madison detailing the difficulties created by states under the Articles of
Confederation).
14 Donald Regan proposes a similar interpretation of congressional power in his insightful
essay on the Commerce Clause, although he does not rely upon the concept of translation. See
Regan, supra note 6, at 594. Barry Friedman also has suggested that interpretation of congres-
sional power might center on whether Congress has demonstrated a need for national legisla-
tion. See Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MnN. L. REv. 317, 405-12 (1997).
A variation on the question I raise about translating Section 8 would be to ask whether the
Necessary and Proper Clause, which concludes that section, empowers Congress to enact any
other law "necessary and proper" for carrying out national objectives. That clause, however,
gives Congress authority "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." U.S. CONsT. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 18 (emphasis added). The reference back to the enumerated "foregoing powers" suggests
some limit on Congress's power under this clause. I prefer, therefore, to suggest a more general
translation of Section 8.
15 1 THE RECORDS, supra note 13, at 21 (May 29) (notes of James Madison).
16 Id. at 53-54 (May 31) (notes of James Madison); 2 id. at 27 (July 17) (notes of James
Madison). On the first vote, Connecticut divided while the other nine states endorsed the reso-
lution. On the second vote, Connecticut assented while two other states (Georgia and South
Carolina) dissented.
17 2 id. at 26-27 (July 17) (notes of James Madison).
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to an enumerated list of powers.18 The full Convention also rejected a more
narrow proposal from the New Jersey delegation that would have given Con-
gress power to govern just a short list of subjects including "trade [and] com-
merce."' 19 The delegates rejected the short list as too narrow, instead
preferring the more abstract principle proposed by the Virginia delegation.
2 0
Where, then, did the enumerated powers of Section 8 come from? The
delegates referred their broad language, giving Congress the power to "legis-
late in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent," to the commit-
tee of detail.2' Ten days later, the committee reported the enumerated
powers of Section 8.22 The full Convention tinkered with some of the specif-
ics, but the delegates did not resume discussion, at least not in any form re-
corded for history, of the relative merits of enumeration versus a general
principle.
18 When the delegates first considered the broad Virginia resolution, Charles Pinckney
and John Rutledge objected that "they could not well decide how to vote until they should see
an exact enumeration of the powers comprehended by this definition." 1 id. at 53 (May 31)
(notes of James Madison). James Wilson responded "that it would be impossible to enumerate
the powers which the federal Legislature ought to have." Id. at 60 (May 31) (notes of William
Pierce). Similarly, Madison explained to the Convention that "he had brought with him into the
Convention a strong bias in favor of an enemeration [sic] and definition of the powers necessary
to be exercised by the national Legislature; but had also brought doubts concerning its practica-
bility. His wishes remained unaltered; but his doubts had become stronger." Id. at 53 (May 31)
(notes of James Madison).; see also id. at 60 (May 31) (notes of William Pierce) ("Mr. Maddison
[sic] said he had brought with him a strong prepossession for the defining of the limits and
powers of the federal Legislature, but he brought with him some doubts about the practicability
of doing it:--at present he was convinced it could not be done."); id. at 59-60 (May 31) (notes of
William Pierce) ("Mr. Sherman was of opinion that [the scope of congressional power] would be
too indifinitely [sic] expressed,--and yet it would be hard to define all the powers by detail.").
Six weeks later, the Convention briefly returned to the desirability of further specifying
congressional powers. Pierce Butler objected that the language previously approved by the dele-
gates, "particularly ... the word incompetent," was too vague. 2 id. at 17 (July 16) (notes of
James Madison). Nathaniel Gorham attempted to reassure Butler that "[t]he vagueness of the
terms constitutes the propriety of them. We are now establishing general principles, to be ex-
tended hereafter into details which will be precise [and] explicit." Id. (July 16) (notes of James
Madison). John Rutledge, on the other hand, supported Butler and moved "that the clause
should be committed to the end that a specification of the powers comprised in the general
terms, might be reported." Id. (July 16) (notes of James Madison). The delegates, however,
refused to approve Rutledge's motion, which would have required greater specification of Con-
gress's powers, on an evenly divided vote. Id. (July 16) (notes of James Madison).
These brief debates suggest at least three different attitudes among the delegates: some of
the delegates seemed to favor enumeration from the beginning, some seemed to believe a more
general delegation of congressional power would be necessary, and some seemed to assume that
the general principle they endorsed was merely a guide to the drafting committee that ultimately
would produce a more detailed enumeration of powers, whatever the merits of that enumeration
would be. The conflicting attitudes, combined with the brief reports of the Convention debates,
makes it difficult to unwrap the history of Section 8 more than two hundred years later.
19 1 id. at 243 (June 15) (notes of James Madison). James Wilson summarized the differ-
ence between the two plans by noting that under the Virginia plan, "the Nat[ional] Legislature is
to make laws in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent," while under the New
Jersey plan, "in place of this [Congress is] to have additional power in a few cases only." Id. at
252 (June 16) (notes of James Madison).
20 Id. at 313 (June 19) (official journal).
21 2 id. at 117-18 (July 26) (official journal).
22 Id. at 181-82 (August 6) (notes of James Madison).
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What is the significance of this shift? Does the change prove conclu-
sively that the Framers wanted to narrow Congress's powers to the specific
problems of state regulation that the Framers had identified in the late eight-
eenth century? Did the Framers consciously, although silently, reject the
broader statement of principle as too dangerous or too broad a delegation of
power? If so, translating Section 8 by reading it to empower Congress to
regulate in any area in which the states have become ineffective would under-
cut the Framers' intent.
This inference, however, is not the only plausible interpretation of Sec-
tion 8's history. The Framers might have worried that an abstract statement
of principle would be too weak in the eighteenth century, and that the new
government needed a full enumeration of its powers so that states would not
challenge congressional power by asserting their own competence to govern
interstate commerce and other matters of national concern. Alternatively,
the Framers might have viewed the enumeration as fully equivalent to the
general principle, seeing the two as completely interchangeable because,
bound by their own circumstances, they could not perceive the emergence of
other areas of state incompetence. If the Framers adopted enumeration for
either of these reasons, translating their list to include new areas in which the
states cannot regulate effectively on their own would be compatible with the
Framers' design.
The original Constitution does not solve this interpretation problem.
Nor does the Tenth Amendment. That amendment expresses a clear desire
to limit congressional power and retain nondelegated powers to the states.
23
The translation of Section 8 I have proposed, however, still limits congres-
sional power and leaves other powers to the states. The limitation simply
occurs at a different level of abstraction.
So should courts translate the enumerated powers in Section 8 to estab-
lish the general principle outlined above? Would this translation be faithful
to the constitutional text and the Framers' intent? I confess that I do not
know the answer to this question, at least not without further inquiry.24 The
23 "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.". U.S. CONsr. amend. X.
24 In particular, my comments on the drafting history of Section 8 are necessarily prelimi-
nary. I am struck, however, by how little attention courts and scholars have paid to this history.
An electronic search of all federal court opinions for "'separate states are incompetent' or 'har-
mony of the United States"' identified only three Supreme Court opinions (two of them dis-
sents) and two lower court decisions quoting this language. Search of LEXIS, Genfed Library,
US File (July 24, 1998). Federal courts, therefore, have rarely quoted the original language of
the Virginia resolution that generated Congress's Section 8 powers.
A similar search of law review articles reveals only twenty-five articles quoting that lan-
guage, and most treat the language summarily. Search of LEXIS, Lawrev Library, Allrev File
(July 24, 1998). Older articles not included in LEXIS may discuss this language more exten-
sively. For a selection of old and new articles considering the evolution of Section 8, including
the original Virginia resolution, see Albert S. Abel, The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional
Convention and in Contemporary Comment, 25 MINN. L. Rnv. 432 (1941); David E. Engdahl,
The Basis of the Spending Power, 18 SEAArE U. L. REv. 215 (1995); David E. Engdahl, The
Spending Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 1 (1994); Jacques LeBoeuf, The Economics of Federalism and the
Proper Scope of the Federal Commerce Power, 31 SA DIEGO L. REv. 555 (1994); Regan, supra
note 6, at 555-57; Robert L. Stern, That Commerce Which Concerns More States than One, 47
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remarkable fact, however, is that the Supreme Court implicitly has answered
this question "yes" without ever explicitly posing the question. The Court
silently has abstracted a general principle from the list in Section 8, translated
the eighteenth-century inventory to the present, and given Congress the
power to regulate any subject that the states cannot regulate effectively. At
the same time, the Court has maintained vociferously that it is doing no such
thing but is simply adhering to the original list. Rather than admit the inter-
pretive problem this Essay discusses and grapples with that problem, the
Court has insisted that almost everything Congress does is a regulation of
"Commerce... among the several States."
It is easy to see why the Supreme Court has chosen this somewhat sur-
reptitious route. The political constraints Lessig has described would make it
difficult for the Court to confront directly the question this Essay poses.25 If
the Court announced that the register of congressional powers in Section 8 is
outdated, that it was going to translate those powers to the twentieth (or
twenty-first) century, and that it would uphold congressional legislation
whenever Congress reasonably concluded that the states could not reach the
same result effectively, then the Court's actions would look too political. A
test of congressional-competence-whenever-the-states-would-be-incompe-
tent, moreover, might leave too much discretion for lower courts. Inconsis-
tent judgments would proliferate and the Court's own docket would be
swamped. The prospects are sufficiently frightening that, even if the Framers
had stuck with their original expression of congressional power, the Court
might have found some way to sidestep that test.
The Court instead has given Congress the power it needs by elaborate
constructions of the Commerce Clause. This is textualism-even twisted tex-
tualism-but it is also pragmatic. It is, moreover, long-settled doctrine that I
do not expect to unravel in one short essay.
It is worth reflecting, however, on the costs of the Court's somewhat
disingenuous approach to congressional power. First, courts ask silly ques-
tions rather than meaningful ones when they consider the constitutionality of
congressional statutes. Commerce Clause cases involve tedious and some-
what arcane attempts to show how various social problems affect the econ-
omy. Courts end up tracing these supposed effects rather than asking the
meaningful question: has Congress acted in an area in which the states could
not regulate effectively on their own?
26
HARV. L. REv. 1335 (1934); John C. Hueston, Note, Altering the Course of the Constitutional
Convention: The Role of the Committee of Detail in Establishing the Balance of State and Federal
Powers, 100 YALE L.J. 765 (1990).
25 See Lessig, Translating Federalism, supra note 1, at 170-76.
26 For example, in Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land & Natural Resources, 471 F. Supp.
985, 995 (D. Haw. 1979), affd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981), the court upheld federal protection
of an endangered bird species found only in Hawaii on the grounds that preservation of the
species would allow the "interstate movement of persons, such as amateur students of nature or
professional scientists who come to a state to observe and study these species." Also, in Building
Industry Ass'n v. Babbitt, 979 F. Supp. 893, 907 n.17 (D.D.C. 1997), the federal government
defended its power to regulate endangered species of fairy shrimp in part by introducing "decla-
rations of at least one out-of-state expert who has bought or sold fairy shrimp specimens (before
they were listed) and who has traveled to California to study them." Congress possesses much
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Second, the Court has lost the ability to reject cases of congressional
action in which there really is no need for national regulation. There is wide-
spread agreement that, although many types of criminal activity demand na-
tional attention, other portions of the federal criminal code are congressional
posturing. Members of Congress like to look tough on crime, especially
around election time, so Congress passes a flurry of criminal laws every two
years without much consideration of whether states are handling the subject
adequately.27 These criminal statutes, however, enjoy the same tenuous con-
nection to interstate commerce that more justifiable laws possess. The Court
is unable to separate the many kernels of legislative wheat from this small but
annoying amount of chaff. When the Court tries, as in the recent United
States v. Lopez decision,28 it stumbles over its own preoccupation with
"commerce." 29
Third, and much more important, I see a loss in our failure to articulate
national values other than commerce. Courts are writing now that Congress
created a federal cause of action for victims of domestic violence because
women are workers, battered women miss days at work, and battering thus
hurts the national economy.3 0 But that wasn't really the point, was it? And I
more substantial reasons than these to regulate endangered species-even when those species
are confined to a single state. The loss of even a single species diminishes the genetic diversity
on our planet and can damage the ecosystem in unforeseen ways. See Tennessee Valley Auth. v.
Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 172-93 (1978) (recounting legislative history of the Endangered Species Act);
National Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1050-54 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. de-
nied, 66 U.S.L.W. 3604 (U.S. June 22, 1998) (No. 97-1451); Building Indus. Ass'n, 979 F. Supp. at
907. Without national regulation, moreover, individual states might eliminate species protection
to lure land developers from other states. This destructive interstate competition would irrepa-
rably harm those species. See National Ass'n of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1054-57. Courts
sometimes mention these rationales, but the Supreme Court's approach to the Commerce
Clause forces lower courts to extol the more tenuous links to interstate commerce described
above.
27 See, e.g., Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief. The Federalization of American Crim-
inal Law, 46 HASTiNGs L.J. 1135, 1145 & nn.70-71, 1159-62, 1165-67 (1995); Thomas M. Mengler,
The Sad Refrain of Tough on Crime: Some Thoughts on Saving the Federal Judiciary from the
Federalization of State Crime, 43 U. KAN. L. REv. 503, 504 (1995); Geraldine Szott Moohr, The
Federal Interest in Criminal Law, 47 SYRAcusE L. REv. 1127, 1130 (1997); Sanford H. Kadish,
Comment, The Folly of Overfederalization, 46 HAsTiNGs L.J. 1247, 1248-51 (1995); see also
Henry J. Friendly, Federalism: A Foreword, 86 YALE L.J. 1019, 1026-27 (1977) ("Considerably
more troubling to me ... has been what seems a knee-jerk tendency of Congress to seek to
remedy any serious abuse by invoking the commerce power as a basis for the expansion of the
federal criminal law into areas of scant federal concern.").
28 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
29 See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 14, at 336-38, 410-12; Regan, supra note 6, at 563-70.
30 See, e.g., Anisimov v. Lake, 982 F. Supp. 531, 538 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (asserting that the
Violence Against Women Act rests on congressional concern over "the nationwide impact on
commerce of women withdrawing from the workplace, being deterred from traveling interstate
and reducing their consumer expending as a result of gender-motivated violence"); Doe v. Doe,
929 F. Supp. 608, 614-15 (D. Conn. 1996) (finding that Congress rationally concluded that "gen-
der-based violence has a substantial effect on interstate commerce" because of "the repetitive
nationwide impact of women withholding, withdrawing or limiting their participation in the
workplace or marketplace in response to ... gender-based violence or the threat thereof"); id. at
613 ("[S]tudies report that almost 50 percent of rape victims lose their jobs or are forced to quit
in the aftermath of the crime.") (quoting S. REP. No. 103-138, at 54 (1993)).
Congress and courts also have noted that domestic violence increases health care costs,
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hope we did not prohibit race discrimination at Ollie's Barbecue just because
we were worried about the amount of catsup Ollie ordered from other
states.31 It would be ennobling-even affirming to those who have suffered
from discrimination-if the Supreme Court admitted that we now have a na-
tional commitment to equality that does not countenance discrimination in
any comer of the nation. That commitment, not tangential effects on the
economy, explains congressional action to reduce bias.
32
The Court's failure to articulate a commitment to equality is especially
perplexing because the guarantee has independent roots in the Fourteenth
Amendment. 33 But there are other areas in which the twentieth-century
states have had difficulty regulating by themselves. The seamlessness of the
ecosystem, for example, combined with market incentives for individual
states to eschew environmental regulation, suggests that Congress must help
creates homelessness, and deters women from traveling interstate. See, e.g., Anisimov, 982 F.
Supp. at 537-38; Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 613. Although these costs are indisputably high, it mini-
mizes the pain of women who suffer from gender-related violence to suggest that Congress pro-
vided a private right of action for this conduct because of its concern for the national economy.
31 In Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), the Supreme Court upheld Title II of
the Civil Rights Act as applied to a restaurant in which a "substantial portion of the food which
it serves ... has moved in commerce." Id. at 298 (quoting section 201 of the Act). The Court
noted that the restaurant at issue, Ollie's Barbecue, "annually receiv[ed] about $70,000 worth of
food which has moved in commerce," and that Congress "determined... that refusals of service
to Negroes have imposed burdens both upon the interstate flow of food and upon the movement
of products generally." Id. at 298, 303.
32 Some supporters of the Civil Rights Act regretted the Act's Commerce Clause founda-
tion because they believed that the Fourteenth Amendment more correctly embodied Con-
gress's moral commitment to racial equality. During deliberations on the Act, Rhode Island
Senator Pastore declared:
[I] believe in this bill, because I believe in the dignity of man, not because it im-
pedes our [commerce]. [I] like to feel that what we are talking about is a moral
issue. [And] that morality, it seems to me, comes under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment [about] equal protection of the law. [I] am saying we are being a little too
careful, cagey, and cautious.
GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CoNsTrTUTONAL LAW 202 (13th ed. 1997). Jus-
tice Douglas made a similar point in an opinion concurring in the Court's decisions upholding
the Act. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 279 (1964) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) ("[T]he right of people to be free of state action that discriminates against them
because of race ... 'occupies a more protected position in our constitutional system than does
the movement of cattle, fruit, steel and coal across state lines."') (quoting Edwards v. California,
314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941) (Douglas, J., concurring)); see also id. at 291 (Goldberg, I., concurring)
("The primary purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1964... is the vindication of human dignity
and not mere economics.").
Similarly, Congress enacted the Violence Against Women Act, not only because it found
that violence causes substantial economic effects, but also because the statute was needed "to
redress an area of civil rights violations that were not being adequately protected by the States."
Anisimov, 982 F. Supp. at 540. Recognizing that fact, together with our national commitment to
insuring equality for women, would dignify the interests of battered women in a way that discus-
sions of their sick days cannot.
33 Congress invoked both the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment when it enacted the Civil Rights Act and, more recently, the Violence Against Women Act.
Courts, however, have preferred to rest congressional power solely on the Commerce Clause. In
part, this avoids further discussion of whether Congress can reach private action under the Four-
teenth Amendment.
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the states regulate the environment. 34 Perhaps courts should acknowledge
the states' difficulties, and Congress's power to respond to those difficulties
with national legislation, rather than pretending that all of our federal laws
are about commerce.
Finally, the Court's textual manipulation of the word "commerce" has
cost us the ability to explain the Constitution's delegation of national power
to the ordinary citizen. Lessig begins one of his essays on translation by
mourning the loss of Alexis de Tocqueville's America, in which ordinary citi-
zens could readily "distinguish[ ] the matters falling within the general pre-
rogatives of the Union from those suitable to the local legislature. '35 We
have not lost that ability just because the Constitution's text has aged and we
no longer comprehend eighteenth-century culture; we have lost that power,
in part, because twentieth-century courts have engaged in interpretive fic-
tions that do not make sense. I could explain to my ten-year-old son that the
Constitution permits Congress to prohibit racial discrimination because ra-
cism anywhere in the country undermines the dignity of all citizens. But my
son would think I was joking if I suggested that the Constitution allows Con-
gress to prohibit race discrimination because those acts occur in settings in
which people purchase goods from other states. Yet the latter explanation is
exactly what the Supreme Court would have him believe.
These are important costs, so we should consider whether the political
constraints Lessig describes are as daunting as we suppose. Lessig, along
with other scholars, argues that the public will not accept constitutional deci-
sions that they perceive as too political.36 Is this popular constraint real, or
have judges and scholars been too timid in predicting what the public will
tolerate?
It is true that the public does not like some constitutional decisions, but
does their disapproval stem from the nature of the Court's reasoning or from
the consequences of the bottom line? The public, after all, did not like the
Supreme Court's holding in the flag burning cases37 any more than the
Court's abortion decision,38 even though the flag burning cases rested rather
tightly on the text of the First Amendment while the abortion decision in-
voked more general principles of privacy. Perhaps we have been too quick to
attribute public disapproval to the political appearance of a court's reasoning
rather than the inevitable effect of the court's decision.
34 See, e.g., John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L.
REv. 1183, 1191-95 & n.60 (1995); Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to Undesir-
ability: Explaining Failures in Competition Among Jurisdictions in Environmental Law, YALE L.
& POL'Y REv.IYALE J. ON REG. 67, 68, 98-105 (1996). Even with a clear need for central gui-
dance, the states retain their own important role in environmental regulation; government in this
field, as in many others, remains multifaceted. See Dwyer, supra.
35 ALEXIS DE TocouEvILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 165 (Anchor 1966), quoted in Les-
sig, Translating Federalism, supra note 1, at 125.
36 See, e.g., Lessig, Translating Federalism, supra note 1, at 174-76.
37 See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 318-19 (1990) (holding that flag burning is
protected speech under the First Amendment); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989)
(same).
38 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (holding that right of privacy protects wo-
man's right to choose abortion under some circumstances).
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Our courts operate in a legal culture that discourages constitutional stan-
dards that appear too political, but how much of that culture is of our own
making? Would the public really complain if courts said that the Framers
intended Congress to legislate on matters in which there was a need for na-
tional legislation and that courts would help implement that design? The
proposition is a tantalizing thought for constitutional theorists. Building
upon Lessig's translation theory, we could refocus our courts' understanding
of congressional power. A "third translation" of the Commerce Clause and
Section 8 would lead to a search for areas in which the national government
has special competence to govern, not just those areas in which it can feign
some association with interstate commerce.
